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This paper compares one of the first applications of probability calculus to human testi- 
mony, a treatise which appeared in 1699 in the Philosophical Transactions, with Laplace’s 
treatise of 1814 on the same subject, in order to emphasize the radical conceptual changes 
which occurred in the field of probability during the late 18th century. The choice of testimony 
is hardly fortuitous. In fact, this was the typical application of probability theory to “civil, 
moral and economic” issues. This topic loomed throughout the 18th century as the back- 
ground to the most remarkable discussions and disputes. The two historical texts herein 
analyzed represent the extremes between the birth of probability calculus and its maturity. 
As is shown, Laplace’s solution is substantially different from that of the 1699 paper. A 
comparison of the two approaches emphasizes how the so-called synthesis of Laplace is by 
no means unquestionable with respect to the 17th and 18th centuries. A more correct 
periodization of the so-called classical age should recognize Thomas Bayes’s fundamental 
memoire (and Laplace’s interpretation of it) as a critical turning point, just as the birth of 
statistics in the late 19th century has traditionally represented its upper boundary. o 1991 
Academic Press, Inc. 
Dans le present article nous nous proposons de comparer d’une part, ce que contient un 
trait6 paru en 1699 dans les Philosophical Transactions a propos de l’application du calcul 
des probabilites aux depositions de temoins (il s’agit la de l’une des premieres applications 
de ce calcul) avec d’autre part, le trait6 de 1814 de Laplace sur le meme sujet. Nous voulons 
ainsi mettre en relief les changements conceptuels radicaux qui ont affect6 le calcul des 
probabilites dans la seconde moitie du 18eme siecle. Le choix du cas particulier des deposi- 
tions de temoins n’est pas fortuit: un tel theme constitue en realite une application typique 
du calcul des probabilites aux “problemes civils, moraux, et Cconomiques.” 11 a souvent CtC 
repris au tours du 18eme siecle et a fait l’objet de controverses et de discussions des plus 
remarquables. Les deux textes historiques que nous analysons sont le fruit d’un choix 
ineluctable car l’un et l’autre se situent aux extremites de l’intervalle qui va de la naissance 
au passage a l’etat mature du calcul des probabilites. On constate que la solution de Laplace 
differ-e substantiellement de celle du traite de 1699. La comparaison met en evidence combien 
la synthese de Laplace est une operation tout autre que paisible par rapport aux 17eme et 
18eme si&cles.Un periodisation plus correct devrait probablement voir dans le memoire 
fondamental de T. Bayes (et la nouvelle interpretation de celle-ci par Laplace) un tournant 
radical de meme que la naissance des statistiques a la fin du 19eme siecle marque traditionnel- 
lement la borne superieure de “l’age classique”. o 1991 Academic Press. Inc. 
In quest0 articolo intendiamo confrontare una delle prime applicazioni de1 calcolo delle 
probabilita alle testimonianze, comparsa nel 1699 sulle Philosophical Transactions, con la 
trattazione the ne fete Laplace nel 1814, per evidenziare, da quest0 particolare punto di 
vista, la radicalita delle trasformazioni concettuali avvenute nella seconda meta de1 ‘700 nel 
campo probabilistico. La scelta de1 tema delle testimonianze non e affatto casuale. Quest0 
e infatti il “luogo” tipico dell’applicazione de1 calcolo delle probabilita alle “questioni civili, 
morali, ed economiche.” Quest0 argomento percorre tutto il Settecento probabilistico, ed e 
16 
03150860/91 $3.00 
Copyright 0 1991 by Academic Press, Inc. 
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 
HM 18 PROBABILITIES 17 
su quest0 terreno the avvengono gli scontri e le discussioni pih rilevanti. Anche i due testi 
storici qui analizzati sono frutto di una scelta obbligata. Essi si collocano agli estremi 
dell’intervallo temporale the separa la nascita de1 calcolo probabilistic0 e la sua raggiunta 
maturit8. Come vedremo, la soluzione di Laplace differisce sostanzialmente dalla trattazione 
del 1699; il confront0 tra le due impostazioni mette in evidenza come la cosiddetta sintesi 
Laplaciana sia un’operazione tutt’altro the pacifica nei riguardi de1 sei-settecento. Una 
periodizzazione probabilmente pih corretta dovrebbe riconoscere nella fondamentale memo- 
ria di T. Bayes (e nella rilettura the ne fete Laplace) un punto di svolta radicale, the delimita 
verso il passato il period0 classico, tanto quanto la nascita della statistica nella seconda meta 
dell’800 ne rappresenta tradizionalmente il limite superiore. o 1991 Academic Press. IW. 
AMS 1980 subject classifications: OlA50, 60-03. 
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1 
In 1699 a brief and anonymous paper, “A Calculation of the Credibility of 
Human Testimony,” appeared in the Philosophical Transactions. The background 
of the paper is the probabilistic stream which following the first approaches to 
probability calculus by Pascal, Fermat, and Huygens [Hacking 19751 attempted to 
extend the calculations beyond games to civil, moral, and economics issues. 
Such an extension was outlined during the early 18th century by Jakob Bernoulli 
in Ars Conjectandi, which was published posthumously in 1713, and best presents 
the probabilistic notions of the 17th century. This famous treatise summed up the 
main contributions of the 17th century on gambling and combinatorial analysis 
and, through the famous Bernoulli theorem, laid the foundations of a mathematical 
arrangement of the first demographic statistical surveys. 
Bernoulli’s work clearly showed that the probability of an event could either be 
determined a priori if the rules of the game or the physical “randomizing” object 
could be thoroughly analyzed or it could be assessed a posteriori, if long sequences 
of results of repeated tests could be observed. However, the “art of conjecturing,” 
applicable to “civil, moral and economic issues,” required a different notion 
of probability, the notion of degree of certitude, which cannot be immediately 
connected to the previous two. 
This third kind of probability essentially involves a single event, where an 
analysis of the cases is impossible both a priori and a posteriori. The degree of 
certitude is determined by ascertaining sufficient causes for the fact, or signs or 
traces or circumstances pointing to it. Bernoulli defined pure and mixed arguments 
and provided composition rules for them [ 11. He also produced a number of simple 
examples, just sufficient to clarify the meaning of the terms. 
Bernoulli’s plan, repeatedly described in his correspondence with Leibniz [2], 
was to complete his treatise with extensive applications of the calculation of 
conjecturing probability to the moral sciences (in particular, law). The initial 
indifference shown by Leibniz, together with Bernoulli’s illness, prevented this 
project from being completed. Thus, the paper examined here turned out to be the 
only application of conjecturing probability “a la Bernoulli” in the field of the 
moral sciences [3]. 
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As will be seen, the relationship between Bernoulli’s thought and the anonymous 
paper is formal rather than substantive. This circumstance helps account for the 
poor reception Bernoulli’s complex vision received in the history of probabilistic 
thought. 
2 
A number of hypotheses on the origin of this particular paper have been 
made. Todhunter [1865, 551 thought that the author could have been the Scottish 
mathematician John Craig [4], who in the same year published Theologiae Chris- 
tianae Principia Muthematica. In this work, Craig dealt with problems similar to 
those treated in the anonymous paper. He stated that the credibility of tradition is 
weakened by the time interval, the spatial distance of the event, and the number 
of people through whom it is transmitted, and strengthened by the number of 
witnesses and the number of independent lines of tradition [5]. 
Although it is obvious that the ideas to which Craig and the anonymous author 
attempted to give mathematical shape are similar, a careful analysis shows that 
the basic concepts of the two works are, in fact, quite different. The rules of the 
anonymous paper are expressed and explained in an appropriate language, which 
shows familiarity with the probabilistic issues of the times. The anonymous author 
was evidently rather familiar with the current theories of gambling, whereas Craig’s 
treatise does not show any conceptual links with these theories, even though the 
work appeared after the works on probability by Pascal, Fermat, and Huygens 
[Shafer 1978, 34-771. 
Karl Pearson [ 1921-1933,466-4671 does not think that the paper was written by 
Craig, but by a person influenced by the mathematical culture of his time and 
aware of problems pertaining to life insurance and annuities. Pearson contended 
that the English astronomer Edmond Halley was the author of the paper. In support 
of this hypothesis, it should be noted that in a paper of 1789, “On the Force of 
Testimony in Establishing Facts Contrary to Analogy,” Reverend M. Young 
criticized the calculation of simultaneous testimony that appeared in the 1699 
paper, calling it “Dr. Halley’s mode” [Todhunter 1865, 4631. ’ 
3 
The paper starts with a brief introduction of the terms “Moral Certitude Abso- 
lute” and “Moral Certitude Incompleat,” defining them in terms of the degree of 
confidence in the witness. 
Mom1 Certitude Absolute, is that in which the Mind of Man entirely acquiesces, requiring no 
further Assurance: As if one in whom I absolutely confide, shall bring me word of 
1200 f  accruing to me by Gift, or a Ships Arrival; and for which therefore I would not give 
the least valuable Consideration to be Ensur’d. 
Moral Certitude Zncompleat, has its several Degrees to be estimated by the Proportion it bears 
to the Absolute. 
As if one in whom I have that degree of Confidence, as that I would not give above One in 
Six to be ensur’d of the Truth of what he says, shall inform me, as above, concerning 
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1200 f: I may then reckon that I have as good as the Absolute Certainty of 
sixths of Absolute Certainty for the whole Summ. [Anonymous 1699, 3591 
a 1000 .f, or five 
Unlike the method of dealing with the problem of certitude in the Ars Conjec- 
tandi, the method here deals with it through references to testimony only. In this 
case, absolute certitude exists when no need is felt to “make sure” [6] of the 
witness’s statement. If the degree of confidence in the witness is only partial, the 
degree of certitude of the thing witnessed, a, that is, d.c.(alA) (A is the statement 
of a by the witness) is equal to the degree of confidence or credibility u of the 
witness stating it. The relevant formula is 
d.c.(a/A) = u, Olurl. (1) 
If a gain +(a) is associated to a, then the statement A brings about the certitude 
of a gain, 
(4) = $(a) d.c.(a/A) = &$v, (2) 
which is proportional to the part of certitude in the thing transmitted by the witness. 
This is true, according to the anonymous author, because (1 - u) d)(a) is the 
maximum to be reasonably spent in order to acquire with certitude the promised 
goods. The pragmatic meaning of u seems therefore to be clear: it is the certain 
part of the expected value. Its complement (the uncertain part) is the upper limit 
of what is reasonably spent in order to acquire the whole. 
The author then states that the credibility of the witness must be assessed on 
the grounds of his moral integrity and ability to understand correctly. This distinc- 
tion of the internal state of the witness according to moral and intellectual attitudes 
will be conserved and analyzed in further depth in treatments of the problem up 
to Poisson [ 18371. 
This is not, however, mathematically represented within the anonymous au- 
thor’s theory. In fact, there is only one parameter which takes into account the 
internal state of the witness as a whole at the time of the statement. We contend 
that the credibility u is a “normal” probability, that is, the probability of the 
internal state V of the witness describing his own “reliability.” If the witness 
produces statements in his state V, he is a source of certitude for the thing. If the 
statement is produced in the state of unreliability, no certitude can be brought 
about for the thing. 
This interpretation is confirmed by the following two propositions, the most 
significant passages of which are quoted: 
Propos. I 
Concerning the Credibility of a Report, made by Single Successive Reporters, who are equally 
Credible. [7] 
Let their Reports have, each of them, Five Sixths of Certainty; and let the first Reporter give 
me a Certainty of a 1000 f, in 1200 f: it is pIain that the Second Reporter, who delivers that 
Report, will give me the Certainty but of 5/6ths, of that 1000 f, or the 5/6ths of 5/6ths of the 
full Certainty for the whole 1200 f. And so a Third Reporter, who has it from the second, will 
transmit to me but 5/6ths of that Degree of Certainty, the Second would have deliver’d me. 
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That is, if, a, be put for the Share of Assurance a single Reporter gives me; and, c, for that 
which is wanting to make that Assurance cornpleat; and I therefore suppos’d to have a/(a + 
c) of Certainty from the First Reporter; I shall have from the Second, a*/(a + c)*; from the 
Third d/(a + c)~ . . . [Anonymous 1699, 3601 
Propos. II 
Concerning Concurrent Testijications [a. 
I f  Two Concurrent Reporters have, each of them, as 5/6ths of Certainty; they will both give 
me an Assurance of 35/36ths, or of 35 to one: If  Three; an Assurance of 215/216, or of 215 
to one. For if one of them gives a Certainty for 1200 f, as of 5/6ths; there remains but an 
Assurance of 1/6th, or of 200 f  wanting to me, for the whole. And towards that the Second 
Attester contributes, according to his Proportion of Credibility: That is to 5/6ths of Certainty 
before had, he adds 5/6ths of the 1/6th which was wanting: So that there is now wanting but 
1/6th of a 1/6th, that is 1/36th; and consequently I have, from them both, 35/36ths of Certainty. 
So from Three, 215/216. That is, if the First Witness gives me a/(a + c) of Certainty, and 
there is wanting of it c/(a + c); the Second Attester will add a/(a + c) of that c/(a + c); and 
consequently leave nothing wanting but c/(a + c) of that c/(a + c), c*/(a + c)~. And, in like 
manner the third Attester adds his a/(a + c) of that c*/(a + c)*, and leaves wanting only c3/ 
(a + c)3 . . . [Anonymous 1699, 3611 
If the two propositions are represented by tree diagrams, which are convenient 
for illustrating the calculation procedure of the expected value according to Huy- 





< l-V, 0 
The random variable is equal to 1 when there is certitude of the thing, and to 0 
otherwise. In the 17th~century mode, the degree of certitude in a is the expected 
value of the random variable 4. In the first case, the expectation is 
(4) = uj . . . u,; 
in the second case, it is 
(4) = 1 - (1 - u,) . . . (1 - u,). 
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The obvious symmetry of the two cases led Prevost [9] to state in 1800 that 
“dans l’appreciation de la valeur du temoignage de deux temoins simultanes, il 
paroit, jusqu’a Lambert, on n’a point use d’un autre artifice, que de prendre le 
complement de la formule employee pour le temoignage successif” [lo]. From 
the point of view of logic, it is important to note that the two examples are 
isomorphic to two ways of chaining independent causes for the same effect. In 
Proposition I, the inherent correctness of each of the single witnesses accounts 
for a “necessary cause” for the certitude of the fact; in Proposition II, it is 
sufficient. 
Omitting for a moment any historical considerations, the second case can be 
considered as an application of the pure arguments ofArs Conjectandi to testimony 
[ 111. There is no evidence, however, of the first case in Bernoulli’s works. 
The causal nature of the pure argument is shown by the fact that its existence 
either indicates the thing or indicates nothing. 
With reference to the paper in question, it can be stated that when the witness 
is reliable, there is certitude for the thing; when he is not reliable, certitude is equal 
to zero. This does not mean certitude of the contrary, but rather implies that, when 
the witness is unreliable, he may either be mistaken or else deceitful, in which 
case the event takes place, or he may be both mistaken and lying, and consequently 
telling the truth. 
According to our interpretation, therefore, a number of concurrent testimonies 
can be reliable as a whole, if at least one testimony is provided under correct 
conditions. In this extreme case, all the remaining testimonies are true, but by 
chance and under unreliable conditions. However, a chain of testimony is reliable 
only if all the witnesses are heard under correct conditions. In this case, acciden- 
tally correct transmission or compensating transmission errors do not contribute 
to certitude. 
These conditions seem sufficient to state that the degree of certitude does 
not measure the statistical concordance of proposition and fact (d.c.(a/A) # 
p(a/A)). This is also shown by the fact that the degree of certitude for a and Care 
not complementary (i.e., d.c.(a/A) + d.c.(Z/A) = 1 is not a theorem); in fact, 
d.c. (G/A) is often not even defined. 
Starting from the above consideration, Shafer [ 19761 has attempted an epistemic 
probability theory, which assumes a mathematical pattern different from the classi- 
cal probability scheme, from the origins of the theory to Kolmogorov. According 
to this approach, the degree of certitude of the 17th and 18th centuries proves 
that epistemic probability and “change,” typical of gambling, are two separate 
concepts. However, we deem that the “oddness” of the degree of certitude lies 
essentially in its meaning. It is not the extent of the occurrence of a, but rather of 
the occurrence of the internal state V on the part of the witness, which assures the 
correctness of the testimony. 
It can be assumed that Eq. (1) can be obtained as 
d.c.(a/A) = p(aVIA) = p(alVA)p(VIA) = p(V) = U, (3) 
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where the equalities are justified by the supposed independence of the internal 
state of the witness and the particular actual situation. If this is true, there is no 
need to recall belief function theories to justify the mathematical properties of the 
degree of certitude. 
In perfect agreement with Bernoulli’s general conception, the degree of certitude 
in the thing is the probability of a sufficient cause for the thing. In the partition 
p(a/A) = p(aV/A) + p(uv/A) the first term represents the certain part, since it is 
produced under conditions which provide “reasons for a”; the second term repre- 
sents a chance connection of thing and relevant statement. From this point of view, 
a contrast between d.c. and posterior probability abounds in deep philosophical 
meanings relevant to the radical change in the 18th-century concept of casuality. 
It must be noted that the d.c. does not depend on the a priori probability of the 
event, and not only in the case of a single testimony. The only source of certitude 
is the witness and his or her reliability. Obviously, if no supporting statements 
exist, d.c.(alQ = 0 (a being the tautology). 
Although accounting for the main purpose of the anonymous paper, the final 
propositions, III and IV, are less important for our aims. Proposition III shows 
how the reliability of a single particular of a narration is higher than the reliability of 
the whole narration, while Proposition IV, summing up the previous propositions, 
justifies the higher reliability of written tradition over oral tradition. The last part 
of the work became well known to scholars because it was virtually copied out in 
Encyclopkdie me’thodique [ 121. 
4 
Laplace [ 131 solved the problem of probability of testimony in the last chapter 
of Book II of ThPorie analytique des probabilite’s, which was omitted in the first 
edition and then presented “avec le development qui exige son importance” in 
1814 [Laplace 1812, 455-4701. It was then presented in a simplified and vulgar- 
ized manner, as an application of the probability calculus to the moral sciences, 
in Essai philosophique sur Zes probabilite’s, which was to become the introduction 
to The’orie analytique des probabilite’s [14]. 
All the examples provided by Laplace refer to drawings from a ballot-box; the 
witnessed fact is the draw of a particular number. The solution scheme is based 
on the principle of probable causes which he had previously presented in 1774 in 
“Memoire sur la probabilite des causes par les evenements” and in 1814 in Essai 
philosophique des probabilite’s [15], and which consists of a generalization of 
Bayes’s formula to any partition of the certain event [Bayes, 17641. 
A Single Testimony 
In the case of one witness only [16], the observed event A is “the witness states 
a “; the likelihoods P(AIa) and P(AlZ) are the probabilities of the statement 
according to whether or not the fact has occurred. They depend on the internal 
state of the witness, i.e., his or her “ability” and “integrity.” The reliability of 
the testimony, i.e., the probability of the hypothesis “a has occurred,” is 
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P(a/A) = 
P(Ala)P(a) 
P(A/a)P(a) + P(Alii)P(Z’) ’ 
(1) 
The denominator represents the manners in which the observed event A (testi- 
mony) can be produced, while the numerator refers only to the manners in favor 
of hypothesis a. 
Whereas according to the anonymous paper the credibility of the fact is equal 
to the reliability of the witness (and the witness is a source of credibility for the 
fact), Bayes’s scheme accounts for the opposite procedure. Here, there are two 
sources for the observed event A: the fact’s occurrence or nonoccurrence. Terms 
P(AIa) and P(AlZ) represent the propensity of the witness to state a as an answer 
to the two different situations. 
(a) The simplest case solved by Laplace consists in determining the reliability 
of the testimony produced by one infallible witness only, the probability of whose 
honesty (or truthfulness) in stating the actual number drawn from a ballot-box 
containing n such numbers is p. 
The a priori probability that the number a is drawn is P(a) = l/n and P(AIa) = 
p. If the witness testifies dishonestly, then P(AIZ) = (1 - p)l(n - I), where the 
factor ll(n - 1) takes into account the probability that the witness, lying, states 
that the number a has been drawn if any other number was actually drawn. 
If the values in (1) are substituted, the following is obtained: 
P/n 
P(a’A) = p/n + [(I - p)l(n - l)][(n - 1)/n] = ” (2) 
Laplace observes: “La probabilite a priori du numero enonce par le temoin est 
l’unite divise par le nombre des numeros de l’urne; elle se transforme en vertb du 
temoignage, dans la veracite mCme du temoin; elle peut done etre affaiblie par le 
temoignage” [Laplace 18 14, LXXX-LXXXI] . 
Formula (2) is apparently very similar to the definition provided by the anony- 
mous author. If, in fact, the witness is described by only one internal parameter, 
and ifp = u, then d.c.(a/A) = p(a/A). It should, however, be observed that, while 
p(dA) = 1 - U, d.c.(Z/A) = 0. This substantial asymmetry applies to all the cases 
considered and will not therefore be mentioned again. 
(b) Laplace considers, still in the case of only one witness, the possibility that 
the witness can make a mistake and may be inclined to lie: 
. . . concevons que I’on ait extrait un numero d’une urne qui en renferme le nombre n, et 
qu’un temoin du tirage annonce que Ie n”i est sorti. L’CvCnement observe est ici Ie temoin 
annoncant la sortie du n”i. Soit p la veracite du temoin, ou la probabilite qu’il ne cherche point 
a tromper; soit encore r la probabilite qu’il ne se trompe point. [Laplace 1812, 4551 
P(a/A) = pr + (1 - pK1 - 4 
n-l * 
The first contribution pr corresponds to the correct statement of a fact that 
actually occurred; the second describes a subjectively wrong, but objectively 
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correct transmission. The factor ll(n - 1) takes into account the probability that 
the error is accidentally compensated for because the witness lied. Summing up 
the case, in Laplace’s words: “La probabilite de son temoignage se compose de 
sa veracite, de la possibilite de son erreur et de la possibilite du fait en lui-meme” 
[Laplace 1812, 4551. 
Full evidence is provided that credibility of the witnessed fact is not a measure 
of the witness’s reliability (in this case, pr), but rather the statistical correlation 
between fact and proposition, averaged according to all the internal states of the 
witness which make it possible. 
It should be observed that it is only a knowledge of the universe of discourse 
that makes this calculation possible. Hypotheses can, in fact, be framed on the 
basis of what might have happened instead of a, or what the witness might have 
seen instead of a, as well as how likely it is that the witness states the proposition 
in all situations. In other words, only a knowledge of all the physical possibilities 
and corresponding possible statements enables an assessment to be made of the 
probability that the fact occurs when the witness is unreliable. 
The Laplacian model of a ballot box of known composition significantly widens 
the possibilities for calculation. However, this gain from the point of view of 
mathematics carries with it a loss of representiveness with regard to the actual 
testimony situation; it amounts to a formalization of the problem corresponding 
to a strong abstraction from the “civil, moral and economic” reality. There is, 
however, a continuity between the “precise-but-abstract” model of the drawing 
and the “confused-but-concrete” model of the 17th century: when the universe of 
discourse is very wide, the probability of guessing the correct answer by chance 
obviously tends to zero; in this case the degree of certitude and the a posteriori 
probability coincide. 
(c) If the witnessed event is extraordinary, on the other hand, the solutions 
proposed by Laplace and by the anonymous author are in full opposition. 
Supposons maintenant que l’urne contienne n - 1 boules noires et une boule blanche, et 
qu’en ayant extrait une boule, un ttmoin du tirage annonce la sortie d’une boule blanche. 
Dtterminons la probabilitk de cette sortie. [Laplace 1812, 4581 
Unlike the previous case, the chance component in the calculation of the true 
testimony can be compared with the deterministic component, since, if the white 
ball was extracted, the dishonest, but mistaken, witness cannot but say “white.” 
If, however, the black ball is extracted, the witness, lying and mistaking, cannot 
but say “white”; hence 
P(aA) = k[pr + (1 - p)(l - 4; P(ZA) = @+,(I - r) + (1 - p)r] , 
hence 
P(a/A) = pr + (1 - PM - 4 
pr + (1 - p)(l - r) + [p(l - r) + (1 - p)r](n - 1) (3) 
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and 
P(a/A) + 0 
The more extraordinary the witnessed fact, the higher the probability of error 
or deceit on the part of the witness. When n is very high, in fact “cette probabilite 
devient a tres peu pres egale a l’unite ou a la certitude, pour peu que l’erreur ou 
le mensonge du temoin soit probable” [Laplace 1812, 4601. 
In this example, 17th-century logic is radically overturned. Not only does the 
reliability of the testimony free itself from dependence on the reliability of the 
witness, understood as a function of his or her inclination toward a subjectively 
faithful transmission, but the a priori probability of the witnessed event can thwart 
the trust in the testimony. Once the reliability of the fact has become a statistical 
relation between the witness’s statement and the occurrence of the thing, it is 
possible to infer something about the witness from his or her testimony. Thus, if 
witnesses tell their stories to people who know what the world is like, they must 
be careful about what they say, or else their reliability may collapse [17]. 
Traditional Chain of Testimonies 
Let us now examine Laplace’s solution to the problem of a traditional chain of 
witnesses, solved for the first time by the anonymous author in Proposition I. 
Considerons presentement une chaine traditionelle de r temoins, et supposons que le fait 
transmis soit la sortie du n”i d’une urne qui renferme n numeros. Designons par yr sa probabi- 
lit& [Laplace 1812, 4661 
Thus yr = P(a/A,), and an iterative equation can then be written for y,.+, in 
terms of truthfulness pr+, of the (r + 1)st witness: 
y I _ p l y + (1 - Pr+l)U - Y,) 
r-k - r-l- r n-l 
Let us consider the two terms composing yr+ I : the first represents the correct 
transmission of the message presented as true, the second the involuntary correc- 
tion of a message presented as false. 
The solution of (4) is [18] 
n - 1 (npl - l)(np, - 1) . . . (nP, - 1) yr= l/n +- * 
n (n - 1)’ 
Laplace observes: 
En gCntral, a mesure que la chaine traditionelle se prolonge, yr approche indefiniment,de sa 
limite l/n, limite qui est la probabilite, a priori, de la sortie du n”i. Le terme (n - l)(np, - 
l)/n(n - 1) . . . de l’expression de y, est done ce que la chaine des temoins ajoute a cette 
probabilite. On voit ainsi comment la probabilite s’affaiblit a mesure que la tradition se 
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prolonge. A la veritC, les monuments, l’imprimerie et d’autres causes peuvent diminuer cet 
effet inkvitable du temps; mais ils ne peuvent jamais entierement le dCtruite. [Laplace 1812, 
4671 
If the universe of discourse is very wide, the formula of the anonymous author 
is obtained; that is, lim,, yr = p1 . . . pr. In this case, in fact, the probability of 
correcting a mistake by chance is virtually nonexistent and the a priori probability 
of the event is negligible. 
It should be noted that if a witness in the chain has truthfulness equal to l/n 
(i.e., he states the proposition in question independently of whether the fact occurs 
or not), the testimonial part of the chain is zero and only the a priori probability 
remains. This corresponds, in the 17th-century case, to no reliability. 
According to Laplace, 1 - (p 1 . . . p,) represents the probability that the fact 
has not occurred, whereas for the anonymous author, it is the extent of incertitude. 
Summing up the two situations, in the case of a large universe (n + ~0): 
P=p,. . . pr. For Laplace this is the probability that the last statement is true; 
for the anonymous author it is the probability that no witness has lied, and, 
therefore, that the proposition is true (it is the extent of the certitude of the 
proposition). 
P=l-(p,. . . p,). For Laplace this is the probability that the last statement 
is false; for the anonymous author it is the probability that at least one witness 
(and, therefore, the chain) is unreliable; it is the extent of incertitude of the 
proposition. 
Simultaneous Witnesses 
Supposons deux tkmoins d’accord sur un fait, et determinons sa probabilitk Pour fixer les 
idCes supposons que le fait soit l’extraction du n”i d’une urne qui en renferme le nombre n, 
en sorte que 1’CvCnement observe soit l’accord du deux tkmoins du tirage & Cnoncer la sortie 
du n”i. 
Nommons p e p’ leurs vCracitCs respective, et supposons, pour simplifier, qu’ils ne se 
trompent point [Laplace 1812, 4631 
PIP2 
pWW2) = 
p1p2 + [Cl - pii1 - p2Nn - 111 
n n(n - 1)2 
PIP2 = 
PIP2 + 
(1 - PlM - P2)’ 
(n - 1) 
Again, the coefficient ll(n - 1)2 represents the probability that either both wit- 
nesses lie or by chance they both state number one, though this had not been 
drawn. If n = 2, i.e., P(Z) = P(a) = t, the following will be obtained: 
p(alA& = 
PIP2 
p1p2 + (1 - P,)U - P2) * 
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For Y witnesses 
obtained: 
having equal truthfulness, the following general formula will be 
P’ 
p’ + (1 - p)’ * (5) 
But: “Cette formule n’est applicable qu’au cas ou l’existence du fait et sa non- 
existence sont entre elles memes egalement probables” [Laplace 1812, 4641 [19]. 
It is obvious that Laplace’s formula is completely different from that given by 
the anonymous author. It is, instead, very similar to Bernoulli’s combination of 
mixed arguments. 
5 
WhY does the anonymous author consider 
explain this, a brief digression is required. 
testimonies as pure arguments? To 
According to Bernoulli, the pure argument in p cases indicates the thing; in 
(1 - p) cases, it does not indicate anything. The mixed argument, instead, 
gives a “normal probability” (in p cases it indicates the thing and in (1 - p) cases 
it indicates the opposite). According to Hacking [1974, 113-1231, pure arguments 
can be represented within a probability space, provided that they are “epistemolog- 
ically independent. ” In our opinion, they are the expression, at a probabilistic 
level, of a causal, intentional probability still representable within a “normal 
probability” space, even though with care [Garibaldi 1986, 295-2981. 
For representability to be valid, the arguments must describe independent and 
sufficient causes for the occurrence of the thing. 
Since, according to the anonymous author, the element which indicates certitude 
is the reliability of the witness, V indicates a while v can be associated both with 
a and 5. This allows testimony to come closer to the pure argument. In the case 
of a number of concurrent witnesses, all the state descriptions (for each person Vi 
or Vi) are possible, even when the same proposition is stated by all of them. But 
the algebra of pure arguments is correct only when these appear, as well as act, 
independently, and this is not so in the case of concurrent testimonies for the same 
fact. The anonymous author, applying Bernoulli’s formula, moves incorrectly from 
the mutual possibility of all the state descriptions and from the independence of 
the witnesses’ internal states to the independence of the different statements, 
without realizing that this is destroyed by the interaction due to the joint statement. 
This error is too fundamental to be passed off as a mere “semantic slip.” 
We shall now present a model which, according to our interpretation, represents 
the error made by the anonymous author; it is a simple model, with which it is 
possible to compare the 17th-century approach and Laplace’s in order to reduce 
the inessential differences and emphasize those which are substantial. The model 
can contain only one parameter for the witness and must respect the 17th-century 
condition of reliability. 
Let us suppose the witness tells the truth or talks nonsense (the psychological 
model is that of the boaster). More precisely, either the witness looks at the drawn 
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number and reports it correctly, or (with his eyes closed) he chooses any number 
(and, therefore, sometimes guesses correctly by chance). Let u be the probability 
that the information imparted is correct. 
If we analyze the statement according to the double partition, “the witness acted 
correctly or not” and ‘the fact occurred or not,” we obtain: 
(l)p(V/A) = u 
(2) p(alA) = u + (1 - u)ln. 
These formulas correctly describe the two “epistemologies” behind the degree of 
certitude and the credibility of testimonies, respectively. 
Thus, the difference between the two formulas lies in their being, respectively, 
the measures of two different events: the two values coincide for n + m, and in 
this case the incertitude in the thing is equal to the probability that the thing does 
not occur. 
This last consideration could be expressed by saying that V, as well as sufficient, 
becomes necessary for a the more the universe grows. 
This interpretation can also be easily extended to the case of testimonial chains. 
In (I), the degree of certitude is the measure of the event V, AV, /I . . . A V, 
(all witnesses are correct). In (2), the credibility is the a posteriori probability of 
the thing after the last statement. In this case, the contribution to credibility by 
the rth witness is represented as [u, + (1 - u,)ln], but nothing changes. 
The recurring equation (4), for n + a, becomes yr+, = u,, , yr. Condition 
yr = u, gives yr = u1 . . . u,. For a the above apply. 
The real problems arise in the case of two concurrent witnesses. 
If A = A, A A, is the joint statement, analyzing A in terms of the internal 
correctness and occurrence of the fact, we obtain 
P(A) = ff P(AIV,%f;ak)p(V;), 
i.j,k 
where the indexes indicate affirmation or negation, i.e., Vi = V,,,: VA = v,,, . 
The likelihood scheme is 
P(AIVJQ) = 1, P(AIV,V2a) = P(A/V,V,a) = l/n, 
-- 
P(AIV,V,a) = lln2, 
P(AIV,V,Z) = 0, P(A/V,V,Z) = P(AI&V2Z) = 0, 
-- 
P(A/V,V2a3 = lln2. 
Note that 
P(A) z P(A, AA2) = u,u,ln + [u,(l - ZJJ + (1 - u1)u2 + (1. - u,)(l - u2)]/n2 
= [l + (n - l)u,u2]/n2 # P(A,)P(A,) = lln2; 
that is, the two statements are not independent if the internal states and the state 
of the world are mutually independent. 
In scheme (1) we shall choose as favorable cases those in which at least one Vi 
is stated; in scheme (2), those in which a is stated. 
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Substituting the values, we obtain 
d.c.(a) = P(V, v V2/A1 AA,) = 1 - (1 - v,)(l - u*) 
(n - l)U& + 1 
n - 1u P(aIA,AA,) = 1 - - - v,)(l - v*) 
n (n - l)u,u, + 1 ’ 
Note that for n ---, 0~) P(a/A, A AZ) + d.c.(a); thus: @T/A, A AZ) + [l - d.c.(a)]; 
that is, the incertitude of the anonymous author is solved, for high values of n, in 
the certitude of the opposite. It is different by nature from d.c.(a); here, the 
absence of good reasons for a becomes a good reason for 5. 
The consistency of the two formulations accounts for the degree of certitude of 
the 17th century, based on the correctness of the witness. 
6 
Referring testimony to the class of pure arguments could have had important 
consequences in the historical development of epistemic probability. Since the 
18th century knew no other examples of the application of Ars Conjectandi to 
concrete problems, and since the conclusions of the anonymous author’s work are 
unjustifiable, it is not surprising that Bernoulli’s whole project was abandoned 
without further critical examination. 
It should be pointed out that J. H. Lambert, the only person who continued 
Bernoulli’s theory of probability, followed the anonymous author rather than 
Bernoulli. Lambert took the two 17th-century formulas in a much wider context 
and chose testimony as the background to “settle accounts” with Bernoulli [20]. 
In our opinion [Garibaldi & Pence 1985,341-3461, even Lambert did not realize 
the causal nature of the pure argument, so that the presumed amendments to 
Bernoulli’s conception ended up burying it completely. Only recently has Ber- 
noulli’s complex vision been reappraised as part of the effort to understand the 
epistemic probability of the 18th century [Hacking 1974, 113-123; Shafer 1978, 
34-771. 
As we mentioned above, the purpose of the theory is the determination of 
probability in the single case where an a priori evaluation is impossible and a 
statistical estimate is excluded “on principle.” The determination of probability 
is carried out through the construction of the maximal reference class for the event 
in question. The existence of independent and sufficient causes (pure arguments) 
for the thing and/or the opposite, causes the d.c. to be defined in the square 
(d.c.(a), d.c.(&) E [0, l]*, while the probability is the projection of vector d.c. 
onto the line x + y = 1. The algebra of the arguments describes the evolution of 
the representative point on the unit square [Garibaldi & Pence 19871. 
Since concurrent testimonies are not independently produced (there are not 
sufficient actual causes), they are controlled by the algebra of pure arguments. 
Since the witnesses of the anonymous author indicate the thing or do not indicate 
anything, they cannot be assimilated into mixed arguments. In our opinion, the 
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error made by the anonymous author and Lambert’s misunderstanding brought 
Bernoulli’s whole conception to a dead end before it could find further applications 
or development [21]. 
We think we have shown the lawfulness and consistency of a probabilistic 
representation of the witness making a correct or absolutely chance statement. He 
or she indicates as a pure argument but, in the case of concurrence, he or she is 
not independent of other testimonies, so that the algebra of pure arguments cannot 
be applied. 
The incorrectness of the anonymous author’s formulas, or, rather, his inconsis- 
tency with any previous or later treatises, should not, however, be used as an 
excuse to reject his vision completely. 
The 17th-century notion of degree of certitude can be understood as a measure 
of the correctness of the internal state of the witness, strictly separate from the 
truth of his or her statement. Given this distinction, it is not possible to assign a 
precise value of truth to statements produced in a state of unreliability. The 
measure of probability of this state is thus the measure of incertitude of the thing; 
Laplace’s analysis, which, by means of the urn model, reconstructs the possible 
modalities of testimonial statements, can assign precise values to all situations. 
This is possible only through a definition of the possible physical worlds (the 
drawing scheme) of the universe of discourse of the witnesses and their relevant 
“agreement” (3 P(A,) = P(A,) = . . . = P(A,) = P(a)). 
It should also be noted that, in the case of the unreliability of all the witnesses, 
the contributions to the probablity of a (which coincide with the “chance part”) 
are structurally nondeterministic. In order to calculate them, it is necessary to 
introduce a model, and the result will serve only predictive, rather than explicative, 
ends. The d.c.(a) is instead the expectation value of the function indicating the 
internal correctness of the witnesses, which is equal to 1 or to 0. It is then the 
average value of a random deterministic variable [Holevo 1982, 161, since a com- 
plete knowledge of the state of the witness determines its value. The opposition 
between degree of certitude and u posteriori probability can thus be observed from 
many points of view, only partly connected to a linear and progressive development 
of mathematical apparatuses or analytic techniques. 
A Bayesian analysis can quantify the “indeterministic” contributions to the 
reliability of the witness; at the same time, however, the “deterministic,” explica- 
tive contributions, logically independent of the fact in question (and therefore 
independent sources of certitude of the thing), are mixed with the contributions 
from a hypothetical model for the thing itself. 
The urn model is certainly too rigid for the concrete testimonies considered 
by the anonymous author. Because of the indeterminateness of the universe of 
discourse in concrete situations, Laplace’s treatise, although exact, cannot go very 
far beyond a qualitative characterization of the problem. Thus, the main limitation 
of the anonymous treatise (i.e., not going into incertitude in depth) allows a 
different and positive interpretation: there is no need to analyze incertitude if 
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the degree of certitude must account for the research of evidence stronger than 
statistical. 
Since Bernoulli’s rule for combining a pure with a mixed argument gives priority 
to the pure argument, it can be said that pure arguments, as a description of 
sufficient causes, account for the last bulwark of a concept of knowledge which 
goes beyond simple statistical concordance. 
Finally, we observe that the model underlying the anonymous author’s formula- 
tion clearly suggests an economic origin. Situations suitable for the treatise could 
be found in the universe of economics itself. In such a case, the discussion would 
not focus on the formulas themselves, but rather on their extension to a universe 
(testimony) which is not suitable for their representation. Similar treatment would 
be given to Laplace’s formulas in the 19th century: they were criticized mainly 
from a psychological or sociological point of view, but still on the grounds of their 
representativeness with respect to the concrete problem of testimony [22]. 
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NOTES 
1. “Puru voco, quae in quibusdam casibus ita rem probant, ut in aliis nihil positive probent: M&a, 
quae ita rem probant in casibus nonnullis, ut in caeteris probent contrarium rei” [Bernoulli 1713, 2441. 
For Bernoulli the value of a number of pure arguments (with a, d, g the total number of cases; c,f, i 
the number of nonproving cases; b, e, f  the number of proving cases) is equal to 1 - cjladg of the 
thing. Pure arguments, therefore, describe sufficient causes and reasons for the thing to occur. In mixed 
arguments (q, t the number of proving cases; r, u the number of cases proving the opposite), the total 
proving force consists of the force of all the particular arguments. The probability of the thing will then 
be qtl( qt + ru), and the probability of the opposite rul( qt + ru). Mixed arguments describe signs and 
traces and are considered as indications for the thing. As regards the composition of pure and mixed 
arguments, the probability for the thing is 1 - [c$ladg][rul(qt + ru)]. 
2. The correspondence between J. Bernoulli and Leibniz, in the years 1703, 1704, and 1705, clearly 
shows that the issues dealt with in “Pars IV” had interested Bernoulli for some time. With reference 
to this, see the articles by C. Gini [1946, 401-413; 1949, 117-1321. 
3. In Encyclope’die me’thodique, under the entry “PROBABILITE, Philosoph. Logiq. Math,” the 
considerations by J. Bernoulli and those by the anonymous author of the paper were dealt with as if 
they were part of the same logical approach [D’Alembert 1785, 640-6491. 
4. Craig lived between the end of the 17th century and the first half of the 18th (he died in 1731). He 
was one of the first to assimilate Leibniz’s thought and applied his methods in his MethodusJigurarum 
lineis rectis et curvis comprehensarum quadraturas determinandi (1685). He was on friendly terms 
with Newton and, following Newton’s approach, he wrote De calculo Jluentium of 1718. He carried 
out research on the brachistochrone and on the generating curve of the minimum resistance solid. He 
became famous with the publication of Theologiae Christianae principia mathematics, in 1699. 
5. K. Pearson wrote: “Thus he [Craig] gets a formula for credibility of the form 
p = x + (m - 1)s + KT21t2 + qD21d2, where x is “the probability that the first witness transmits”; 
m is the number of witnesses in the chain and s is the suspicion created by a transfer, t is the interval 
elapsed and d the distance of the event; and k, T, q, and D constants. In order to make P zero, we give 
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to the “suspicion,” s, negative values. The whole formula is perfectly arbitrary, as are Craig’s numerical 
values for the constants. He deduces that in 800 years, the whole of the verbal testimony for the life 
of Christ would have disappeared as far as credibility is concerned. He further reckons that in 3150 
years from the birth of Christ all credibility for the written testimony would have disappeared, or there 
was still credibility for another 1451 years beyond the time (1699) of writing his Principia [Pearson 
1921-1933,465-4661. Laplace wrote: ‘Craig a essay6 de soumettre au calcul l’affaiblissement graduel 
des preuves de la religion chretienne: en supposant que le monde doit finir a l’epoque ou elle cessera 
d’etre probable, il trouve que cela doit arriver 1454 ans apres le moment oti il Ccrit. Mais son analyse 
est aussi fautive que son hypothese sur la duree du monde est bizarre” [Laplace 1814, XC]. 
6. The ambiguity of the term “ensured” implies a relationship between the psychological process of 
“making sure” and the technical process of “being insured,” in the sense of “buying an insurance 
policy” to cover the risk that the thing does not occur. The procedure for calculating the degree of 
confidence in a witness announcing the arrival of certain goods is founded on the maximum part of the 
expected value which the subject is ready to pay in order to be insured against the risk that the goods 
do not arrive. The probability calculus is justified by the existence and (supposed) rationality of the 
economic practice of becoming insured. The degree of certitude describes the mental aspects relevant 
to such economic behavior.This foundation of subjective probability has been completely ignored, 
although it dates from 60 years prior to Bayes’s works and is logically independent of the “classical” 
deduction of subjective probability from gambling, as was mentioned in de Witt [Fenaroli et al. 1981, 
329-3411. In a new paper we shall compare in more depth the treatise by the anonymous writer and 
that by C. Huygens [Fenaroli 1983, 297-3241, who built a nonsubjective concept of probability on the 
same economic background. 
7. A succession of reporters is understood as traditional transmission: A reports a fact to B, who, 
in turn, refers the fact to C, and so on. 
8. Concurrent testimonies refer to a number of witnesses independently reporting the same fact. 
9. P. Prevost [ 1751-18381, professor of philosophy in Geneva, wrote, together with Lhuilier, four 
essays on probability. Three were published in 1799 in the volume for 1796 of Memoires de 1’Acude’mie 
de Berlin: “Sur les probabilites”; “Sur l’art d’estimer la probabilite des causes par les effects”; and 
“Remarques sur l’utilite et l’etendue du principe par lequel on estime la probabilite des causes.” The 
fourth essay, “Memoire sur l’application du calcul des probabilites a la valeur du temoignage,” was 
published in 1800 in the volume of Me’moires de I’AcadPmie de Berlin for 1797. 
10. The passage is in the first section of the essay by Prevost, “Remarques sur l’utilite et l’etendue 
du principe par lequel on estime la probabilite des causes”. The whole passage is quoted by [Todhunter 
1865, 4591. 
11. Such an application is not unquestionable: in fact Ars Conjectandi in no way authorizes assimila- 
tion of testimony to the pure argument instead of to the mixed. From the historical point of view, a 
long time elapsed between the elaboration and the posthumous publication of the treatise by Bernoulli. 
The anonymous author could have been acquainted with some first drafts of the treatise, or he could 
have heard of Bernoulli’s ideas in the probabilistic “milieu.” 
12. This part is in Volume II of Encyclope’die mtthodique published in 1785, under the entry 
“PROBABILITE, Philosoph. Logiq. Math.” in the “troisieme source de probabilite,” the testimony 
[D’ Alembert et al. 1785, 645-6491. 
13. Before the breakthrough of Laplace, Nicolaus Bernoulli dealt with legal issues in his thesis, De 
Usu Artis conjectundi injure 117093. In his important treatise, Essai sur l’upplicution de l’anulyse ci la 
probubilite’ des de’cisions rendues h la pluralire’ des uoix [1785], Condorcet adopted the first Bayesian 
approach to the study of testimony and court judgments. The anonymous author-Bernoulli line ex- 
tended to the German philosopher J. H. Lambert, who criticized and corrected J. Bernoulli, in his most 
important philosophical work Neues Orgunon [ 17641, with an example drawn from the theory of 
testimony. 
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14. In the “Avertissement” to the second edition of The’orie analytique des probabilite’s (1814), 
Laplace wrote: “Cette introduction qui sert de preface a l’ouvrage, parait encore separement sous ce 
titre: Essai Philosophique sur les probabilites”. 
15. Principe: “Si un Cvenement peut Ctre produit par un nombre n de causes differentes, les 
probabilites de l’existence de ces causes prises de l’evenement sont entre elles comme les probabilites 
de I’CvCnement prises de ces causes, et la probabilite de l’existence de chacune d’elles est Cgale a 
probabilite de l’evenement prise de cette cause, divisee par la somme de toutes les probabilites de 
l’evenement prises de chacune de ces causes” [Laplace 1774, 291. 
VI Principe: “Chacun de causes auxquelles un Cvenement observe peut Ctre attribue est indiquee 
avec d’autant peu de vraisemblance, qu’il est plus probable que, cette cause &ant supposee exister, 
l’evenement aura lieu: la probabilite de I’existence d’une quelconque de ces causes est done une 
fraction, dont le numerateur est la probabilite de l’evenement resultante de cette cause, et dont le 
denominateur est la somme des probabilites semblables relatives a toutes les causes. Si ces diverses 
causes, considerees a priori, sont inegalement probables, il faut, au lieu de la probabilite de l’evenement, 
resultante de chaque cause, employer le produit de cette probabilite par celle de la cause elle meme” 
[Laplace 1814, XIV]. 
16. The solution provided by Laplace is reported in a modern formulation. 
17. It is here most evident how a conflict between the witness’s authority and the information on the 
state of the world, which is the background to the origin of modern science and of the notion of 
mathematical probability itself, is dramatically solved to the benefit of the “internal evidence” of 
rationality, rather than to the “external evidence” of the authority. 
18. Since A, = (npr+, - l)l(n - 1) and R, = (1 - p,+J/(n - 1) the equation y,, , - A,.y, = R, (the 
difference equation of the first order with variable coefficients) is obtained, the solution of which is 
In this case C = y1 = p1 (as 
truthfulness of the witness). 
r-l 
yr = CA, . . .A,-, + (A, . . . A,-,) 2 -&-- 
p=l AI. . .A,’ 
seen above. with one witness only, the credibility of the fact is the 
19. With reference to this, the observations by J. M. Keynes may be of interest [1921, 198-2011. 
20. Lambert [1764] developed the theory of logic probability exhaustively. In paragraph 239, pages 
741-742 of Section V of Phenomenology, entitled “On the probable,” Lambert criticized the formula 
provided by J. Bernoulli in the composition of pure and mixed arguments (as stated by Todhunter 
[1865, 4621). 
21. We have already mentioned the other fundamental factor of a cultural and philosophical nature, 
which was opposed to a “causal” notion of epistemic probability and epistemology in general: the 
Humean criticism of casuality. I f  cause was but the constant association of two phenomena, its 
probabilistic version was to be fully represented by Bayes’s formulas and in the conceptual generaliza- 
tion provided by Laplace. On a formal level, it is a development of Bernoulli’s concept of mixed 
arguments, where “normal” extensional, statistical probabilities operate. Thus, an opposition between 
causes and signs, which constitute the pivot of Bernoulli’s complex vision, will result in “signifying” 
the cause (and/or the hypothesis) without clearly realizing its traumatic and upsetting effects on 
epistemology. 
22. See, for example, [Varoli 19571 and [Bertrand 18891, in particular, Chapter XIII, “Probabilites 
des decisions,” of the latter. 
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